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Across the pond and back again: what direct lenders should know before deploying historic dry powder
In this article, the authors compare the approaches US and European direct lenders take to certain deal terms and highlight market-specific trends.
25 March 2024Intralot’s drop-down restructuring games: priming pari passu noteholders, circumventing non-consenters and artificially reducing asset values
Intralot is the first European group to restructure its debt using the “J. Crew”-inspired drop-down procedure, transferring its unencumbered US business away from unsecured noteholders due to be repaid in 2024, to be used to support secured debt to refinance unsecured notes maturing earlier in 2021. The trustee for the notes due in 2024 is suing and there is a separate claim for fraudulent transfer. In this article, the authors explore: how unsecured pari passu and pro rata noteholders came to prime others by becoming senior secured noteholders under the drop-down procedure; how the drop down was achieved by a US subsidiary issuing unsecured notes due 2025, swapping them for the unsecured notes due 2021 issued by a holding company, being designated an “Unrestricted Subsidiary”, with its shares and assets then being pledged as security for the notes due 2025; how Intralot exploited imprecise but standard drafting of the covenants to ensure the value of the US business was low enough to fit within investment basket capacity required to be used for the drop-down; why only 75% of the primed noteholders may have decided to stay being supported by the non-US business rather than exchange for equity in the US business; how the different bargaining power among creditor groups impacted the restructuring and resulted in unequal outcomes for creditors in the same class; how a minority of 2021 noteholders withheld consent to force repayment of 59% of their notes at par prior to the refinancing-by-drop-down; and “J. Crew” blockers as anti-drop-down provisions and their frequency in 2021.
25 March 2024Secured finance law reform: the Joint Coordination Network
In December 2021, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the international Institute on the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and a few other governmental and non-governmental organisations launched a Joint Network for Coordinating and Supporting Secured Transactions Reforms (Network). The main objective of the Network is to coordinate the activities of participating organisations in providing technical assistance and capacity building to States and organisations in secured transactions and related reforms. The Network also seeks to facilitate the modernisation and enhancement of secured transactions frameworks, particularly through the adoption and implementation of international standards in this area.1 The Network is the result of four coordination conferences jointly organised and held by the members of the Network in recent years.
25 March 2024Regulating cryptocurrency by policing advertisements: the approach in the UK, Singapore, India and Spain
In this article the author considers the regulatory approach of four jurisdictions to the policing of cryptocurrency advertisements.
25 March 2024Interest under a loan linked to a base rate: issues to consider
This article considers the issues that it is suggested finance lawyers should have in mind if asked to advise on a proposed loan where the interest payable is to be linked to the Bank of England bank rate, the base rate of another central bank, or the base rate of the lender. The author focuses on key differences between different methods of calculating interest, how interest rates can be structured and various practical issues that arise.
25 March 2024It is dangerous to use pithy terms to describe the complex risks of a fund
For marketing purposes, the complex and multiple risks of a fund are often summarised in catchy terms which ultimately are inaccurate or incomplete. This can lead to a charge of misrepresentation and censure by the regulator and litigation by the investors.
25 March 2024Interpreting statutes and contracts: what are the differences? Part I
In this Part 1, Richard Calnan discusses the similarities between contractual and statutory interpretation and then explores one important difference. Part 2, to be published in a later edition, will discuss three other important differences.
25 March 2024A comparison of re-proposed SEC Rule 9j-1 and the UK/EU Market Abuse Regulation
Despite industry criticism of the Rule 9j-1 originally proposed in 2010, the SEC recently re-proposed Rule 9j-1 with even further reach in antifraud, anti-manipulation liabilities for security-based swaps. In particular, the re-proposal lowers the standard of mental state requirement for insider trading liabilities, adds a new prohibition on acts and attempted acts of price manipulation, and seeks to apply similar expanded violations to assets underlying or related to the security-based swap. Compared to the re-proposed Rule 9j-1, the UK/EU Market Abuse Regulation has a different scope and is not specifically designed to apply to swaps and derivatives, but contains prohibitions in the same categories as those under the re-proposed Rule 9j-1.
25 March 2024Sanctions test illegality clauses in financial contracts
The recent sanctions imposed in response to the war in Ukraine have meant that the consequences of illegality under financial transactions such as derivatives, repo and securities lending have again been in the spotlight for financial institutions and their clients. The legal position varies across different market standard agreements. This article considers the relevant provisions in the ISDA aster Agreement (2002 version) (ISDA Master Agreement), the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement (2010 version) (GMSLA) and the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (2011 version) (GMRA), in each case assuming that the governing law is English law.
25 March 2024Does the liquidator have a duty to deal with trust assets?
The extent, if any, to which the liquidator of a corporate trustee is under duties in relation to trust property has received very limited attention from the English courts. The point is important since corporate trustees collectively hold property worth trillions. If such trustees cannot be placed in special administration proceedings or if the administrator of a corporate trustee is unable fully to deal with trust property prior to the end of the special administration, the absence of any duty on the liquidator to deal with such property in some appropriate way would open up a serious lacuna in the efficacy of the liquidation regime. This article sets out tentative and exploratory considerations that may assist a court asked to address this question.
25 March 2024
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